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ABSTRACT
Empirical evidence suggests that as much as 1/3 of the U.S. business cycle is due to nominal shocks.
We calibrate a multi-sector menu cost model using new evidence on the cross-sectional distribution
of the frequency and size of price changes in the U.S. economy. We augment the model to incorporate
intermediate inputs. We show that the introduction of heterogeneity in the frequency of price change
triples the degree of monetary non-neutrality generated by the model. We furthermore show that the
introduction of intermediate inputs raises the degree of monetary non-neutrality by another factor of
three, without adversely affecting the model's ability to match the large average size of price changes.
Our multi-sector menu cost model with intermediate inputs generates variation in real output in response
to calibrated aggregate nominal shocks that can account for roughly 23% of the U.S. business cycle.
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Much applied work in monetary economics relies on models in which nominal rigidities are the key
friction that generates monetary non-neutrality. The workhorse models in this literature|e.g., the
Calvo (1983) model and the Taylor (1980) model|make the simplifying assumption that the timing
of price changes is independent of rms' incentives to change prices. It has been recognized at least
since Caplin and Spulber (1987) that models based on this assumption can yield very dierent
conclusions about monetary non-neutrality than models in which nominal rigidities arise due to
a xed cost of changing prices (see also Caballero and Engel, 1991 and 1993; Caplin and Leahy,
1991 and 1997; Danziger, 1999; Dotsey et al., 1999). Golosov and Lucas (2007) calibrate a menu
cost model based on newly available micro-data on the frequency and size of price changes and
conclude that nominal rigidities due to menu costs yield monetary non-neutrality that is \small
and transient".
Given the importance of nominal rigidities as a source of monetary non-neutrality in most
models that analyze the transmission of monetary policy, this conclusion poses a serious challenge
for monetary economics. If realistically modeled nominal rigidity yields monetary non-neutrality
that is small and transient, much of our understanding of the transmission of monetary policy is
called into question. It is therefore of great importance for monetary economics to assess whether
the implications of highly stylized menu cost models hold up in a richer, more realistic setting.
Monetary economists have long relied heavily on strategic complementarity in price setting
to amplify the degree of monetary non-neutrality generated by nominal rigidities. One natural
response to Golosov and Lucas's paper is therefore to simply ramp up the degree of strategic
complementarity between price setters. However, recent work has cast doubt on this method for
amplication in models with nominal rigidities by showing that the introduction of several popular
sources of strategic complementarity renders the models unable to match the average size of micro-
level price changes for plausible parameter values (Klenow and Willis, 2006; Golosov and Lucas,
2007; Burstein and Hellwig, 2006).
In this paper, we address both of these challenges. We extend a simple benchmark menu
cost model to include two features for which there exists particularly clear empirical evidence: 1)
heterogeneity across sectors in the frequency and size of price changes; 2) intermediate inputs. We
show that when we subject our model to calibrated nominal shocks it generates uctuations in real
1output that can account for 23% of the U.S. business cycle.1
This result of our model accords well with the empirical evidence on the importance of nominal
shocks for business cycle uctuations. Shapiro and Watson (1988) attribute 28% of the variation in
output at short horizons to nominal shocks.2 In contrast, the Golosov and Lucas model generates
uctuations of real output that can account for only roughly 2% of the U.S. business cycle. Roughly
half of the dierence in monetary non-neutrality in our model relative to the model of Golosov and
Lucas (2007) is due to the introduction of heterogeneity in the frequency of price change; the
remaining half is due to the introduction of intermediate inputs.
Importantly, our model has no trouble matching the average size of price changes even though
the introduction of intermediate inputs generates a substantial amount of strategic complementarity
in price setting. To explain this, we follow Ball and Romer (1990) and Kimball (1995) in dividing
the sources of strategic complementarity into two classes|!-type strategic complementarity and

-type strategic complementarity. We show that models with a large amount of !-type strategic
complementarity are unable to match the average size of price changes, while this problem does
not aict models with a large amount of 
-type strategic complementarity. The introduction of
intermediate inputs increases the amount of 
-type strategic complementarity. It therefore does
not aect the size of price changes or require unrealistic parameter values.
Midrigan (2006) and Gertler and Leahy (2008) discuss several additional mechanisms that raise
the degree of monetary non-neutrality generated by menu cost models. Midrigan (2006) argues
that the Golosov-Lucas model overstates the strength of the \selection eect". He augments the
Golosov-Lucas model by allowing for fat-tailed idiosyncratic shocks and multi-product rms with
scale economies in changing prices. He shows that these features mute the selection eect and
thereby increase monetary non-neutrality. The empirical importance of these features depends on
the extent to which product level heterogeneity|as opposed to fat-tailed shocks|explains the size
distribution of price changes. Gertler and Leahy (2008) analyze a model in which labor markets are
1Here we compare the variance of real output generated in the model in response to nominal shocks to the variance
of HP-ltered real GDP.
2In fact, Shapiro and Watson (1988) refer to these shocks as \demand" shocks. We follow Lucas (2003) in
interpreting these shocks as \nominal" shocks. As Lucas (2003) discusses, these shocks capture not only monetary
shocks, but also temporary monetary non-neutrality due to real shocks. Monetary shocks themselves are commonly
estimated to account for a relatively modest fraction of business cycle variation in output (see, e.g., Cochrane, 1994;
Smets and Wouters, 2007). More comprehensive measures of monetary non-neutrality are higher. The estimates
of Justiniano and Primiceri (2008a) imply that more than 2/3 of business cycle uctuations are due to monetary
non-neutrality.
2assumed to be independent at the sector level. They assume that rms in only a subset of sectors
receive idiosyncratic shocks and change their price in each period. The resulting staggering of price
changes across sectors generates 
-type strategic complementarity that amplies the monetary
non-neutrality in their model. However, time series data on the evolution of the frequency of price
change in U.S. economy does not support the notion that the frequency of price change in particular
sectors varies greatly over time, even for narrowly dened product categories within the same city.
Without a large amount of such time series variation, the Gertler-Leahy model does not generate
a quantitatively signicant degree strategic complementarity.
Our multi-sector model generates three times more monetary non-neutrality than a single sector
model calibrated to the mean frequency of price change. We also calculate the degree of monetary
non-neutrality generated by a single sector model calibrated to the median frequency of price
change. This calibration of the single sector model yields a degree of monetary non-neutrality
that is quite similar to that of the multi-sector model. This suggests that researchers that seek
to calibrate single sector models for the U.S. economy should use the median frequency of price
change rather than the mean frequency of price change.
To understand the eect that heterogeneity has on the degree of monetary non-neutrality in our
model, consider the response of the economy to a permanent shock to nominal aggregate demand.
In the Calvo model, the eect of such a shock on output at any given point in time after the shock
is inversely proportional to the fraction of rms that have changed their price at least once since
the shock occurred. If some rms have vastly higher frequencies of price change than others, they
will change their prices several times before the other rms change their prices once. But all price
changes after the rst one for a particular rm do not aect output on average since the rm has
already adjusted to the shock. Since a marginal price change is more likely to fall on a rm that
has not already adjusted in a sector with a low frequency of price change, the degree of monetary
non-neutrality in the Calvo model is convex in the frequency of price change and heterogeneity
therefore amplies the overall degree of monetary non-neutrality in the economy relative to a single
sector model calibrated to the mean frequency of price change (Carvalho, 2006).
The relationship between the frequency of price change and the degree of monetary non-
neutrality is more complicated in a menu cost model since rms are not selected at random to
change their prices. In menu costs models, the dierence in monetary non-neutrality between two
3sectors will depend not only on their relative frequencies of price change but also on what underlying
dierences cause the sectors to have dierent frequencies of price change. Caplin and Spulber (1987)
analyze an extreme case in which changes in the size of price changes completely oset changes in
the frequency of price change and money is completely neutral regardless of the frequency of price
change. We show that the degree of amplication due to heterogeneity depends critically on the
relationship between the frequency of price change and the size of price changes across sectors in
the menu cost model more generally. Intuitively, heterogeneity in characteristics across sectors can
cause variation in the strength of the \selection eect" across sectors that can oset variation in
the frequency of price change across sectors. We furthermore show that the degree of amplication
due to heterogeneity varies with the economy's average frequency of price change.
Our conclusion that heterogeneity amplies the degree of monetary non-neutrality by roughly a
factor of 3 for our multi-sector menu cost model is driven by three features of the U.S. data: 1) the
low average level of ination in the U.S. economy, 2) the fact that the average size of price changes
is large and that there is no strong correlation between the size and frequency of price change
across sectors, and 3) the relatively low average frequency of price change in the U.S. economy.
We perform a number of counterfactual simulations to illustrate these results. Under alternative
assumptions about the ination rate and the size of idiosyncratic shocks (inconsistent with U.S.
data) heterogeneity in the frequency of price change yields minimal amplication of monetary non-
neutrality. This contrasts with the Calvo model in which heterogeneity in the frequency of price
change amplies monetary non-neutrality irrespective of these other characteristics of the economy.
Bils and Klenow (2002) and Carvalho (2006) investigate the eect of heterogeneity in the fre-
quency of price change in multi-sector Taylor and Calvo models.3 Bils and Klenow (2002) analyze
the Taylor model and nd that heterogeneity amplies the degree of monetary non-neutrality by
a modest amount. Carvalho (2006) considers both the Taylor and Calvo model as well as sev-
eral time-depentent sticky information models. He incorporates strategic complementarity into his
model and considers a dierent shock process than Bils and Klenow (2002). Carvalho (2006) shows
that in time-dependent models the eect of heterogeneity rises with the degree of strategic comple-
mentarity. In contrast, we nd that in our menu cost model the amplication due to heterogeneity
is roughly independent of the degree of strategic complementarity. More recently, Bouakez et al.
3See also Aoki (2001).
4(2009a,b) have extended these results to consider heterogeneity along additional dimensions.
The other feature that amplies the degree of monetary non-neutrality in our model is inter-
mediate inputs. As in earlier models with time-dependent price setting, introducing intermediate
inputs amplies the degree of monetary non-neutrality because the intermediate inputs cause the
pricing decisions of dierent rms to become strategic complements (Basu, 1995; Huang et al.,
2004; Huang and Liu, 2004; Huang, 2006). Intuitively, in the model with intermediate inputs, rms
that change their price soon after a shock to nominal aggregate demand choose to adjust less than
they otherwise would because the prices of many of their inputs have not yet responded to the
shock.
Finally, we also consider an extension of our model that incorporates the idea that rms may
at times receive opportunities to change their prices at comparatively low costs for various reasons.
These additional low cost price changes will increase the degree of price exibility in the economy.
However, since their timing is not chosen optimally, they will induce less price exibility than the
same number of regular price changes. Using this model, we show that introducing a moderate
number of time-dependent price changes into a purely state dependent model has little impact on
the overall degree of monetary non-neutrality. Conversely, introducing a small number of state-
dependent price changes into a purely time-dependent model has a large eect on the overall degree
of monetary non-neutrality.
We argue that times at which rms introduce new products are an important example of such
low cost price changes. We document that product turnover is by far most important in durable
goods sectors such as apparel and automobiles and that in these sectors the appropriate model of
product turnover is likely to be dierent from the appropriate model of price changes for identical
items|particularly in sectors such as apparel and automobiles with highly seasonal product cycles.
We show that if price changes due to product introduction are time-dependent, rather than state-
dependent, they have only a trivial eect on the degree of monetary non-neutrality in the model.
Our analysis builds on the original work on menu cost models in partial equilibrium by Barro
(1972), Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Mankiw (1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and others. The
implications of menu costs in general equilibrium have been analyzed analytically in simple models
by Caplin and Spulber (1987), Caballero and Engel (1991, 1993), Caplin and Leahy (1991, 1997),
Danziger (1999), Dotsey et al. (1999) and Gertler and Leahy (2008). Willis (2003), Burstein (2005),
5Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan (2006) analyze the implications of menu cost models in
general equilibrium using numerical solution methods similar to ours. Finally, we build on a long
literature in monetary economics on real rigidities and the use of intermediate inputs by Ball and
Romer (1990), Basu (1995), Kimball (1995), Woodford (2003) and others.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a description of the multi-sector menu cost
model with intermediate inputs. Section 3 discusses our calibration of the model. Section 4 contains
our results regarding the eect of heterogeneity on monetary non-neutrality. Section 5 contains
our results on the eect of intermediate inputs on the degree of monetary non-neutrality. Section
6 contains our results on the eect of product turnover on price exibility. Section 7 contains a
discussion of the quantitative importance of our results. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Multi-Sector Menu Cost Model
The model we develop is a multi-sector generalization of the model presented by Golosov and Lucas
(2007) in which rms use intermediate inputs as well as labor as a factor of production.
2.1 Household Behavior


















where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information known at time t, Ct denotes
household consumption of a composite consumption good and Lt denotes household supply of labor.
Households discount future utility by a factor  per period; they have constant relative risk aversion
equal to ; the level and convexity of their disutility of labor are determined by the parameters !
and  , respectively.
Households consume a continuum of dierentiated products indexed by z. The composite










where ct(z) denotes household consumption of good z at time t and  denotes the elasticity of
substitution between the dierentiated goods.
6The households must decide each period how much to consume of each of the dierentiated
products. For any given level of spending in time t, the households choose the consumption bundle
that yields the highest level of the consumption index Ct. This implies that household demand for















The price level Pt has the property that PtCt is the minimum cost for which the household can
purchase the amount Ct of the composite consumption good.
A complete set of Arrow-Debreu contingent claims are traded in the economy. The budget
constraint of the households may therefore be written as




where Bt+1 is a random variable that denotes the state contingent payos of the portfolio of nancial
assets purchased by the households in period t and sold in period t + 1, Dt;t+1 denotes the unique
stochastic discount factor that prices these payos in period t, Wt denotes the wage rate in the
economy at time t and t(z) denotes the prots of rm z in period t. To rule out \Ponzi schemes",
we assume that household nancial wealth must always be large enough that future income suces
to avert default.















and a transversality condition. Equation (6) describes the relationship between asset prices and
the time path of consumption, while equation (7) describes labor supply.
2.2 Firm Behavior
There are a continuum of rms in the economy indexed by z. Each rm belongs to one of J sectors
and specializes in the production of a dierentiated product. The production function of rm z is
7given by,
yt(z) = At(z)Lt(z)1 smMt(z)sm; (8)
where yt(z) denotes the output of rm z in period t, Lt(z) denotes the quantity of labor rm z
employs for production purposes in period t, Mt(z) denotes an index of intermediate inputs used
in the production of product z in period t, sm denotes the materials share in production and At(z)










where mt(z;z0) denotes the quantity of the z0th intermediate input used by rm z.
Following Basu (1995), we assume that all products serve both as nal output and inputs into
the production of other products. This \round-about" production model reects the complex input-
output structure of a modern economy.4 When the material share sm is set to zero, the production
function reduces to the linear production structure considered by Golosov and Lucas (2007). Basu
shows that the combination of round-about production and price rigidity due to menu costs implies
that the pricing decisions of rms are strategic complements. In this respect, the round-about
production model diers substantially from the \in-line" production model considered, for example,
by Blanchard (1983). The key dierence is that in the round-about model there is no \rst product"
in the production chain that does not purchase inputs from other rms. The fact that empirically
almost all industries purchase products from a wide variety of other industries lends support to the
\round-about" view of production.5





where prots in period t are given by
t(z) = pt(z)yt(z)   WtLt(z)   PtMt(z)   jWtIt(z)   PtU: (10)
Here It(z) is an indicator variable equal to one if the rm changes its price in period t and zero
otherwise. We assume that rms in sector j must hire an additional j units of labor if they decide
4See Blanchard (1987) for an earlier discussion of a model with \horizontal" input supply relationships between
rms. Huang, Liu, and Phaneuf (2004) uses the round-about production model to explain variation in the cyclicality
of real wages over the 20th century. Huang and Liu (2004) and Huang (2006) investigate the persistence of monetary
non-neutrality in a model with round-about production. These papers all assume staggered price contracts of xed
length.
5See Basu (1995) for a detailed discussion of this issue.
8to change their prices in period t. We refer to this xed cost of price adjustment as a \menu cost".
Finally, U denotes xed costs the rm must pay to operate. The level of these costs aect the level
of prots of the rm as a fraction of output, making it possible to reconcile large markups estimated
in the industrial organization literature with small prots in the national accounts. These xed
costs do not aect the rm's decision problem.
Firm z must decide each period how much to purchase of each of the dierentiated products it







Combining consumer demand|equation (3)|and input demand|equation (11)|yields total de-







where Yt = Ct +
R 1
0 Mt(z)dz. It is important to recognize that Ct and Yt do not have the same
interpretations in our model as they do in models that abstract from intermediate inputs. The
variable Ct reects value-added output while Yt reects gross output. Since gross output is the
sum of intermediate products and nal products, it \double-counts" intermediate production and
is thus larger than value-added output. GDP in the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts
measures value-added output. The variable in our model that corresponds most closely to real
GDP is therefore Ct.
The rm maximizes prots|equation (9)|subject to its production function|equation (8)|
demand for its product|equation (12)|and the behavior of aggregate variables. We solve this
problem by rst writing it in recursive form and then by employing value function iteration. To do
this, we must rst specify the stochastic processes of all exogenous variables.
We assume that the log of rm z's productivity follows a mean-reverting process,
logAt(z) = logAt 1(z) + t(z); (13)
where t(z)  N(0;2
;j) are independent. Notice that we assume that the variance of rm's id-
iosyncratic shocks are sector specic.
We assume that the monetary authority targets a path for nominal value-added output, St =
PtCt. Specically, the monetary authority acts so as to make nominal value-added output follow a
9random walk with drift in logs:
logSt =  + logSt 1 + t (14)
where t  N(0;2
) are independent. We will refer to St either as nominal value-added output or
as nominal aggregate demand.6
The state space of the rm's problem is innite dimensional since the evolution of the price
level and other aggregate variables depend on the entire joint distribution of all rms' prices and
productivity levels. Following Krusell and Smith (1998), we make the problem tractable by assum-
ing that the rms perceive the evolution of the price level as being a function of a small number of









To allow for convenient aggregation, we also make use of log-linear approximations of the rela-
tionship between aggregate labor supply, aggregate intermediate product output and aggregate
value-added output.
Using the function   to form expectations about the price level turns out to be highly accurate.
Figure 2 plots the perceived law of motion for ination|i.e.,  |as well as the actual log ination
rate as a function of log(St=Pt) over a 1000 month simulation of the multi-sector model using our
benchmark calibration.   is a step function since we solve the model on a grid for log(St=Pt).
For over 99% of months, the dierence between the perceived law of motion and the actual law of
motion is less than one grid point in our discrete approximation of ination. The approximation
errors scale with the size of the grid we use, implying that the errors can be made increasingly
small as we raise the number of gridpoints.8 We have experimented with larger grids and found
that this does not aect our results. Krusell and Smith (1998) emphasize the R2 of a regression of
the actual law of motion on the perceived law of motion as a test of accuracy. In our model, the
R2 of a regression of true ination on perceived ination is larger then 99%, similar to the results
in Krusell and Smith (1998) and Midrigan (2006). Den Haan (2008) advocates going beyond this
6This type of specication for nominal aggregate demand is common in the literature. It can be justied by a
model of demand in which nominal aggregate demand is proportional to the money supply and the central bank
follows a money growth rule. It can also be justied in a cashless economy (Woodford, 2003). In a cashless economy,
the central bank can adjust nominal interest rates in such a way to achieve the target path for nominal aggregate
demand. In section 4, we consider a generalization of the model in which St follows an AR(1) process in growth rates.
7Willis (2003) and Midrigan (2006) make similar assumptions.
8This is true up to a point well beyond the grid size needed to get an accurate solution.
10test to assess multi-period perception errors by comparing long simulations generated on the one
hand entirely from using the perceived law of motion ( ) and on the other hand entirely from using
the actual law of motion (simulating the entire model). In a 1000 period simulation of this type
for our model, we nd that the root mean squared error for both ination and output are less then
one grid point and again scale with the number of gridpoints in our simulation without aecting
our results on monetary non-neutrality. For the model reported in gure 2, the root mean squared
error for ination is less than ve hundredths of a percent.
Given these assumptions, rm z's optimization problem may be written recursively in the form



























where V () is rm z's value function, R
t (z) denotes rm z's prots in real terms at time t and
DR
t;t+1 denotes the real stochastic discount factor between time t and t + 1.9
An equilibrium in this economy is a set of stochastic processes for the endogenous price and
quantity variables discussed above that are consistent with household utility maximization, rm
prot maximization, market clearing and the evolution of the exogenous variables At(z) and St.
We use the following iterative procedure to solve for the equilibrium: 1) We specify a nite grid of
points for the state variables, At(z), pt 1(z)=Pt and St=Pt. 2) We propose a function  (St=Pt 1)
on the grid. 3) Given the proposed  , we solve for the rm's policy function F by value function
iteration on the grid. 4) We check whether   and F are consistent.10 If so, we stop and use  
and F to calculate other features of the equilibrium. If not, we update   and go back to step 3.
We approximate the stochastic processes for At(z) and St using the method proposed by Tauchen
(1986).11
9In appendix A, we show how the rm's real prots can be written as a function of (At(z);pt 1(z)=Pt;St=Pt) and
pt(z).
10We do this in the following way: First, we calculate the stationary distribution of the economy over
(A(z);p(z)=P;S=P) implied by   and F as described in appendix B. Second, we use the stationary distribution
and equation (4) to calculate the price index implied by  |call it P |for each value of S=P. Third, we check
whether jP    Pj < , where j  j denotes the sup-norm.
11A drawback of numerical methods of the type we employ in this paper is that it is dicult to prove unique-
ness. The main feature of our model that potentially could generate non-uniqueness is the combination of strategic
complementarity and menu costs (Ball and Romer, 1991). However, the large idiosyncratic shocks that we assume
in our model signicantly reduce the scope for multiplicity (Caballero and Engel, 1993). In particular, the type
of multiplicity studied by Ball and Romer does not exist in our model since the large idiosyncratic shocks prevent
sucient synchronization across rms. In this respect our results are similar to John and Wolman (2004). It is also
conceivable that our use of Krusell and Smith's approximation method could yield self-fullling approximate equilib-
112.3 The CalvoPlus Model
Much applied work in monetary economics relies on models in which the timing of price changes
is independent of rm's incentives to change prices. Such price changes are said to be \time-
dependent". In this subsection, we describe an extension of our menu cost model in which a fraction
of price changes are largely time-dependent. We use this model to assess the sensitivity of our purely
state-dependent benchmark model to the introduction of a small number of time-dependent price
changes and, conversely, the sensitivity of time-dependent models to the introduction of a small
number of state-dependent price changes.
The most widely used model of time-dependent price changes is the model of Calvo (1983).12 In
this model, price changes are free with probability (1 ) but have innite cost with probability .
These extreme assumptions make the Calvo model highly tractable. However, they also cause the
model to run into severe trouble in the presence of large idiosyncratic shocks or a modest amount of
steady state ination.13 The reason is that the rm's implicit desire to change its price can be very
large and it frequently prefers to shut down rather than continue producing at its pre-set price.
Rather than assuming that price changes are either free or innitely costly, we assume that
with probability (1 ) the rm faces a low menu cost j;l, while with probability  it faces a high
menu cost j;h. These assumptions retain the tractability of the Calvo model. But at the same
time they capture the idea that the timing of some price changes is largely orthogonal to the rm's
desire to change its price in a more realistic way than the Calvo model does. We refer to this model
as the \CalvoPlus" model. The CalvoPlus model has the appealing feature that it nests both the
Calvo model and the menu cost model as special cases.14
ria. There is, however, nothing in the economic link between agents beliefs and their pricing decision that suggests
such self-fullling equilibria. In fact, the actual behavior of the price level in our model is quite insensitive to even
relatively large changes in beliefs. The reason for this is that by far the most important factor in agent's decisions is
movements in their idiosyncratic productivity levels as opposed to movements in aggregate variables. We solved our
model with more sophisticated beliefs (additional moments) and starting our xed point algorithm at various initial
values. In all cases the resulting approximate xed point is virtually identical.
12Examples of papers that use the Calvo model include Christiano et al. (2005) and Clarida et al. (1999). An
alternative time-dependent price setting model was proposed by Taylor (1980). This model has been used, e.g., by
Chari et al. (2000).
13See Bakhshi et al. (2006) for an analysis of the latter issue.
14Our CalvoPlus model is related to the random menu cost model analyzed by Dotsey et al. (1999) and Caballero
and Engel (2006). It is also related to the model developed by Midrigan (2006). Midrigan augments the Golosov-
Lucas model by allowing for fat-tailed idiosyncratic shocks and multi-product rms with scale economies in changing
prices. These features imply that the hazard of price change is much less strongly related to the rm's price relative
to its desired price, muting the selection eect as in our CalvoPlus model.
123 Calibration
We focus attention on the behavior of the economy for a specic set of parameter values. Table 1
reports our benchmark parameter values. We set the monthly discount factor equal to  = 0:961=12.
We assume log-utility in consumption ( = 1). Following Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988), we
assume linear disutility of labor (  = 0). The most important way in which these parameters aect
our results is through the elasticity of the real wage with respect to output. Our calibration implies
that the elasticity of the real wage with respect to output is equal to one|equation (7). Solon,
Barsky, and Parker (1994) estimate that the elasticity of real wages with respect to output in the
U.S. is in fact only about 0.6. In our model, a higher elasticity of the real wage reduces monetary
non-neutrality. On the face of it, our calibration thus seems tilted towards generating too little
monetary non-neutrality. However, we show below that the absence from capital in our baseline
model lowers the elasticity of marginal costs by roughly the same factor. Our benchmark model
thus implies a degree of monetary non-neutrality similar to a model that incorporates capital and
is calibrated to match the cyclicality of real wages.
We set ! such that in the exible price steady state labor supply is 1/3. We set  = 4 to roughly
match estimates of the elasticity of demand from the industrial organization and international trade
literatures.15 Our choices of  = 0:0028 and  = 0:0065 are based on the behavior of U.S. nominal
and real GDP during the period 1947-2005.16 Since our model does not incorporate a secular trend
in economic activity, we set  equal to the mean growth rate of nominal GDP less the mean growth
rate of real GDP. We set  equal to the standard deviation of nominal GDP growth.
We calibrate the size of the menu cost and the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks in each sector
of our model based on empirical evidence on the frequency and size of price changes excluding
sales in consumer prices across sectors of the U.S. economy presented in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008).17 We group goods with similar price change characteristics into 6 sectors, 9 sectors and
15Berry et al. (1995) and Nevo (2001) nd that markups vary a great deal across rms. The value of  we choose
implies a markup similar to the mean markup estimated by Berry et al. (1995) but slightly below the median markup
found by Nevo (2001). Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate elasticities of demand for a large array of disaggregated
products using trade data. They report a median elasticity of demand below 3. Also, Burstein and Hellwig (2006)
estimate an elasticity of demand near 5 using a menu cost model. Midrigan (2006) uses  = 3 while Golosov and
Lucas (2007) use  = 7. The value of  aects our calibration of the menu cost|a higher  imply higher menu
costs|and it aects our calibration of the intermediate input share|a higher  implies lower values for sm. Holding
xed the frequency of price change, the value of  does not aect the degree of monetary non-neutrality in our model.
16Our results are virtually identical if we set  = 0 rather than  = 0:0028.
17We have also used the distribution of the frequency of price change including sales. We nd that both of these
distributions yield a similar results regarding amplication of monetary non-neutrality due to heterogeneity. We do
1314 sector. Table 2 presents the mean frequency and mean absolute size of price changes for these
sectors.18 Both the frequency and size of price changes varies enormously across sectors. There is
no simple relationship between these two variables (see gure 3). Furthermore, the distribution of
the frequency of price change is highly asymmetric. The right tail being much longer than the left
tail. This skewness implies that the mean frequency of price change across sectors is much higher
than the median frequency of price change|21.1% versus 8.7% for 1998-2005.19
Table 3 presents the parameterization of the menu cost and the variance of the idiosyncratic
shocks at the sectoral level that allow the model to match the empirical statistics on the frequency
and size of price changes presented in table 2. We report the average yearly cost of changing prices
in each sector as a fraction of steady state revenue. In all cases, the cost of changing prices is less
than 1% of revenue and in most sectors it is less than 0.5%. The cost of changing prices is less
than half as large in the model with intermediate inputs as it is in the model without intermediate
inputs.
The standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks needed to match the size of price changes in
the data are quite large. They range from about 3% to about 11%. Figure 4 plots a sample path
for a \typical" rm in the model with intermediate inputs. The plot illustrates that the standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks is many times larger than the standard deviation of the shocks
to nominal aggregate demand. As is emphasized by Golosov and Lucas (2007), this is crucial for
generating price changes suciently large to match the data. It is also crucial for generating the
substantial number of price decreases observed in the data.20 For computational reasons, we set
the speed of mean reversion of the rm productivity process equal to  = 0:7. This value is close
to the value we estimate for  in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008).
The parameter sm denotes the cost share of intermediate inputs in the model. Table 4 contains
information from the 2002 U.S. Input-Output Table published by the Bureau Economic Analysis.
not have an analytical proof of unique identication in the multi-sector model. In numerical simulations, we have
found that variation of parameters in one sector has virtually no eect on the size and frequency in other sectors.
This implies that the overall model is uniquely identied since the parameters in each sector are uniquely identied.
18To be able to aggregate the sectors easily, we calibrate the multi-sector models to the mean frequency and mean
absolute size of price change at the sectoral level. The dierence between the sectoral mean and median are small.
19In Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), we nd a similar pattern for nished goods producer prices. In the producer
prices case the mean is 24.7% while the median is 10.8%.
20Empirical evidence suggests that variation of rm productivity is in fact much smaller than what is implied by
our calibration (Abraham and White, 2007). The idiosyncratic productivity shocks should therefore be viewed as a
stand-in for a broader class of idiosyncratic shocks that cause variation in rms' desired prices.
14The table provides information about both the share of intermediate inputs in the gross output of
each sector (column 1) and about how intensively the output of each sector is used as an intermediate
input in other sectors (column 2). The revenue share of intermediate inputs varies from about 1/3
to about 2/3. It is highest in manufacturing and lowest in utilities. The use of dierent sectors
as intermediate inputs (column 2) is closely related to their weight in gross output (column 4).
In particular, services are used heavily as an intermediate input (accounting, legal, consulting,
nancial, marketing). The main deviations from this pattern is that the output of manufacturing
is used somewhat more intensively as intermediate inputs than its weight in gross output would
suggest while the output of the government sector and the construction sector are used less.
The weighted average revenue share of intermediate inputs in the U.S. private sector using CPI
expenditure weights was roughly 52% in 2002. The cost share of intermediate inputs is equal to
the revenue share times the markup. Our calibration of  implies a markup of 1.33. Our estimate
of the weighted average cost share of intermediate inputs is therefore roughly 70%.
This calibration depends on a number of assumptions. Alternative assumptions yield estimates
of the intermediate inputs share that are either lower or higher. On the one hand, we employed
CPI weights as we do elsewhere in the paper. Using gross output weights would yield a slightly
lower number (63% rather than 70%) since services have a higher weight in gross output than in
the CPI. However, increasing the weight of services would also lower the mean frequency of price
change and increase the skewness of the frequency distribution. A higher value for the elasticity of
demand would also yield a lower intermediate input share. For example, Golosov and Lucas (2007)
use  = 7. This would yield and intermediate input share equal to 60% rather than 70%.
On the other hand, we have assumed that intermediate inputs make up the same fraction of
marginal costs as they do average variable costs. With a more general production structure, this is
not necessarily the case. Materials might be disproportionately important at the margin, in which
case the share of intermediate inputs in marginal costs would be higher than we estimate. Also, the
constant intermediate inputs share that matches the behavior of an economy with heterogeneity in
the use of intermediate inputs across sectors is slightly higher than the average sm across sectors
(see discussion in section 5). Given the uncertainty associated with these factors, we report results
for a range of dierent values for sm from 0.5 to 0.9 in table 8 below.21
21Basu (1995) and Bergin and Feenstra (2000) argue for values of the parameter sm between 0.8 and 0.9. Huang
et al. (2004) favor a value of 0.7. Rotemberg and Woodford (1995), Chari et al. (1996) and Woodford (2003, ch. 3)
15The assumption of round-about production implicitly assumes that prices are rigid to all cus-
tomers whether they are consumers or rms. Direct evidence on producer prices from Carlton's
(1986) work on the Stigler-Kindahl dataset as well as Blinder et al.'s (1998) survey of rm man-
agers supports the view that price rigidity is an important phenomenon at intermediate stages of
production. In Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), we present a more comprehensive analysis of pro-
ducer prices based on the micro-data underlying the producer price index and nd that the rigidity
of producer prices is comparable to the rigidity of non-sale consumer prices. The median frequency
of price change of nished goods and intermediate goods producer prices is 10.8% and 14.3%, re-
spectively, while the median frequency of price change of consumer prices is 8.7%. Moreover, we
document a high correlation between the frequency of non-sale consumer price changes and the
frequency of producer price changes at a very disaggregated level. This evidence is reproduced in
table 5. Over the 153 matches, the correlation between the frequency of price change for producer
prices and consumer prices excluding sales is 0.83.
Our baseline model abstracts from capital accumulation. However, in appendix C we develop
a model with capital to assess the eect that capital has on our results. The main way in which
introducing capital into our model aects our results is by aecting the variability of marginal costs
and thus the degree of real rigidity in the model. In the baseline model with intermediate inputs,
the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output is equal to 1   sm = 0:3. In appendix C,
we derive an upper bound of 0.38 for the elasticity of marginal costs with respect to output in the
model with capital. The empirical results of Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) on the cyclicality
of real wages suggest that for the U.S. economy the elasticity of real wages with respect to output
is in fact only about 0.6. Our baseline calibration assumes a unit elasticity of the real wage with
respect to output, somewhat overstating the response of real wages relative to empirical evidence.
If we incorporate Solon, Barsky and Parker's empirical estimate for the wage elasticity into our
model with capital we get an elasticity of marginal cost of 0.28. This is almost exactly equal to
the elasticity of 0.3 that we assume in our baseline model. In other words, we have adopted a
baseline specication that implies an elasticity of marginal costs similar to what is implied by a
use values closer to sm = 0:5. The lower values of sm are based on much lower calibrations of the markup of prices
over marginal costs than we use. These low markups are meant to match the fact that pure prots are a relatively
small fraction of GDP in the U.S.. We base our calibration of the markup of prices over marginal costs on evidence
from the industrial organization and international trade literature. These high markups are consistent with small
pure prots if rms have xed costs and/or if rm entry involves sunk investment costs that must be recouped with
ow prots post-entry as in our model (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Ryan, 2006).
16model with capital and calibrated to match the empirical evidence presented in Solon, Barsky, and
Parker (1994). We discuss this in detail in apprendix C.
4 Heterogeneous Price Rigidity and Monetary Non-Neutrality
Our primary interest is the degree of monetary non-neutrality generated by the menu cost model.
Table 6 presents estimates of this for a number of dierent calibrations of the model. We measure
the degree of monetary non-neutrality as the variance of real value-added output when the model
is simulated with purely nominal aggregate shocks.22 We rst consider the behavior of the menu
cost model with the intermediate input share set to zero. We will consider the eect of introducing
intermediate inputs in section 5.
The rst column of table 6 presents results for our 6, 9 and 14 sector models as well as two
calibrations of a single-sector version of our model. The degree of monetary non-neutrality is
sharply increasing in the number of sectors. The 14 sector model generates roughly three times
as much monetary non-neutrality as the single-sector model that is calibrated to match the mean
frequency of price change.23 The table also reports results for the single-sector model calibrated
to match the median frequency of price change. This calibration of the single-sector model yields
a degree of monetary non-neutrality that is more similar to the multi-sector model than does the
single-sector model calibrated to match the mean frequency of price change.
Why does heterogeneity in the frequency of price change amplify the degree of monetary non-
neutrality? A simplifying feature of the model without intermediate inputs is that the pricing
decisions of dierent rms are virtually independent. This is due to a combination of two features
of our model. First, rms face a constant elasticity of demand which implies that their static
desired price is a constant markup over marginal costs. Second, rms' marginal costs are MCt(z) =




t = !Ct where the second equality is due to
our choice of preference parameters (see table 1). This implies that Wt = !PtCt = !St and
MCt(z) = !St=At(z). So, rm z's marginal costs are exogenous and therefore independent of other
22This measure of monetary non-neutrality has been used, e.g., by Midrigan (2006). An alternative measure of
monetary non-neutrality is the cumulative impulse response (CIR) of real value-added output to a permanent shock
to nominal aggregate demand. If our model were log-linear and delivered an AR(1) response of real output to a
permanent shock to nominal aggregate demand these measures would be proportional. We have calculated the CIR
for all cases presented in the paper and the results are practically identical using this alternative measure.
23We considered models with more than 14 sectors. They yielded very similar results to the 14 sector model.
17rm's prices.
In this case, the degree of monetary non-neutrality in the economy is approximately a weighted
average of the monetary non-neutrality in each sector viewed independently. Heterogeneity in
the frequency of price change across sectors, therefore, increases the overall degree of monetary
non-neutrality in the economy if the degree of monetary non-neutrality in dierent sectors of the
economy is a convex function of each sector's frequency of price change (Jensen's inequality).
The simplest model in which to study the relationship between heterogeneity in the frequency
of price change and monetary non-neutrality is the Calvo model since in that model the rms that
change their price in each period are a random sample of all rms. Carvalho (2006) shows that in
the Calvo model the degree of monetary non-neutrality is highly convex in the frequency of price
change. The intuition for this is simple. Consider the response to a permanent shock to nominal
aggregate demand. In the Calvo model, the eect of the shock on output at any given point in
time after the shock is inversely proportional to the fraction of rms that have changed their price
at least once since the shock occurred. If some rms have vastly higher frequencies of price change
than others, they will change their prices several times before the other rms change their prices
once. But all price changes after the rst one for a particular rm do not aect output on average
since the rm has already adjusted to the shock. Since a marginal price change is more likely to
fall on a rm that has not already adjusted in a sector with a low frequency of price change, the
degree of monetary non-neutrality in the Calvo model is convex in the frequency of price change.
In the menu cost model, rms are not selected at random to change their prices. The relationship
between the frequency of price change and the degree of monetary non-neutrality in dierent sectors
of the economy is therefore more complicated in a menu cost model. It depends crucially on the
nature of the dierences between the sectors that give rise to the dierences in the frequency of
price change. Consider two sectors|A and B|in the menu cost model. One reason why sector
A may have a lower frequency of price change than sector B is that rms in sector A face larger
menu costs than rms in sector B. Another possible reason is that rms in sector A may face
smaller idiosyncratic shocks but face menu costs of the same size. These two cases will give rise to
dierent implications regarding the relative degree of monetary non-neutrality in the two sectors.
We can empirically distinguish between there two cases in our model because they have dierent
implications about the size of price changes.
18The degree of monetary non-neutrality generated by each sector in a menu cost model is gov-
erned by the degree to which the distribution of relative prices of dierent rms in that sector
changes in response to monetary shocks. To build intuition, it is instructive to consider the model
analyzed by Caplin and Spulber (1987). They consider a continuous time model with no idiosyn-
cratic shocks and a process for aggregate demand that always increases. In this setting, rms raise
their relative price to a level S whenever it hits a level s. If the initial distribution of relative prices
is uniform it will continue to be uniform at all future dates and money will thus be neutral for any
frequency of price change. The Caplin-Spulber economy is the limiting case of our model when
ination is high, idiosyncratic shocks small and the time period short.24
For an economy with many sectors, the relationship between the frequency of price change
and monetary non-neutrality depends critically on the relationship between the frequency of price
change and the size of price changes across the dierent sectors. This is illustrated in gure 5. Each
of the solid lines in this gure plots the degree of monetary non-neutrality in a sector for a given
variance of idiosyncratic shocks as the size of the menu cost changes. The top line has the largest
idiosyncratic shocks and the bottom line the smallest. For each level of the variance of idiosyncratic
shocks, the frequency of price change falls and the degree of monetary non-neutrality increases as
the size of menu costs increase. But the level of monetary non-neutrality at a given frequency of
price change is dierent depending on the variance of the idiosyncratic shocks. This occurs because
the \selection eect" becomes stronger as the size of the idiosyncratic shocks is reduced at a given
frequency of price change since the average ination rate becomes a more and more important
determinant of price changes relative to the idiosyncratic shocks. Intuitively, reducing the size of
idiosyncratic shocks moves the economy towards the Caplin-Spulber extreme.
In actual economies, the variance of idiosyncratic shocks may vary greatly across sectors. This
implies that the dierent sectors in a particular economy need not lay on the same line. The dashed
24Caballero and Engel (1991, 1993) generalize the results of Caplin and Spulber (1987) to a case with idiosyncratic
shocks. To derive their neutrality results, Caballero and Engel must maintain the assumption that the dynamic
optimal price always increases. They must therefore eectively assume that the idiosyncratic shocks are either very
small or one-sided. Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) present evidence that a sizable
fraction of price changes are price decreases. The data are thus inconsistent with Caballero and Engel's assumptions.
An alternative setting in which money is neutral in the presence of idiosyncratic shocks is a slight variation of the one
analyzed by Danziger (1999). Danziger (1999) assumes uniformly distributed idiosyncratic shocks large enough that
all rms have an equal probability of exiting the inaction band regardless of the initial price. The resulting frequency
of price change is much higher than what we observe in the data. Danziger's model implies monetary neutrality if the
menu cost takes the same form as in our model. Thus, the parameterizations of the menu cost model that generate
monetary neutrality require either very small or very large idiosyncratic shocks and are inconsistent with the data.
19line illustrates this by connecting four sectors of a hypothetical economy which has one sector on
each line. In this example, the relationship between the size of menu costs and the variance of
idiosyncratic shocks across sectors is such that the sector with the lowest frequency of price change
has the lowest degree of monetary non-neutrality and the relationship between the frequency of
price change and monetary non-neutrality is concave as opposed to the convex shape of each of the
solid lines. A wide range of relationships between the frequency of price change and the degree of
monetary non-neutrality are possible by connecting points on dierent lines.
Another determinant of the degree of amplication of monetary non-neutrality due to hetero-
geneity is the level of the overall frequency of price change. Table 7 illustrates this using a number of
simple one and two sector models. Holding xed the spread between the frequency of price change
in the two sectors of the two sector economy, as we raise the average frequency of price change, the
degree of amplication relative to a single sector model with the same average frequency of price
change diminishes. Specically, the rst row presents results for a two sector economy in which
half of rms have a frequency of price change equal to 10% and the other half have a frequency
of price change of 20%. This economy is compared to a single-sector economy with a frequency
of price change equal to 15%. The two-sector economy yields 14% more monetary non-neutrality.
Rows 2 through 4 show that the degree of amplication falls steeply for similar comparisons as the
overall frequency of price change rises. A comparison of rows 1, 5 and 6 shows that amplication
arises from heterogeneity in the frequency of price change across sectors, not other features such as
its skewness.
Now that we have established what can happen in the model, let's consider what does happen for
parameter values calibrated to U.S. data. The darker line in gure 6 plots the variance of real output
as a function of the frequency of price change for our calibration of the U.S. economy. It shows
that the relationship between the degree of monetary non-neutrality and the frequency of price
change in our model is highly convex. This yields the large amount of amplication documented
in table 6. The convexity in our baseline calibration is a consequence of three features of the U.S.
data: 1) the low average level of ination in the U.S. economy, 2) the fact that the average size
of price changes is large and that there is no strong correlation between the size and frequency of
price change across sectors, and 3) the relatively low average frequency of price change in the U.S.
economy. The lighter line in gure 6 plots a counterfactual calibration of our model in which we
20have assumed that the yearly ination rate in the U.S. is 12% rather than 3.5% and the variance
of the idiosyncratic shocks that aect rm's marginal costs are roughly 4 times smaller than in our
baseline calibration. In this case, the relationship between the degree of monetary non-neutrality
and the frequency of price change is almost linear and heterogeneity implies little amplication of
monetary non-neutrality.
Our baseline model assumes that nominal output follows a random walk with drift. Empirically,
the growth rate of U.S. nominal GDP over the period 1947-2005 is better described as an AR(1) with
an autoregressive coecient of roughly 0.5 at a quarterly frequency. For robustness, we have solved
a version our model in which nominal output growth follows an AR(1) calibrated to the data.25
The model with AR(1) growth in nominal output yields somewhat higher monetary non-neutrality
than the baseline model.
As Midrigan (2006) emphasizes, the eects of persistence in the money growth process are
quite dierent in the menu cost model than the Calvo model.In the menu cost model, rms may
optimally delay price changes after they see a shock to nominal output in anticipation of further
movements in the same direction in the near future. This desire to optimally time price changes
may lead to wider sS bounds in the AR(1) case than the random walk case. In the Calvo model,
rms are not able to time their price changes. Those rms that have an opportunity to change their
price immediately after a persistent shock respond preemptively to future expected movements in
nominal output since they can't know when they will again get to change their price, raising the
responsiveness of prices. Midrigan (2006) notes that rms with state-dependent pricing policies do
not have the same incentive to front-load since they are able to choose the timing of their next
price adjustment after a shock.
To evaluate the sensitivity of our results to the introduction of time-dependent price changes
we consider simulations of the CalvoPlus model introduced in section 2.3. The degree of monetary
non-neutrality in the CalvoPlus model is highly sensitive to the fraction of price changes that
occur in the low cost state. Figure 7 plots the variance of output in a single sector version of the
CalvoPlus model as the fraction of price changes in the low menu cost state varies from zero to
one. In this experiment, we set 1  equal to the median frequency of price change in the economy
25We choose the autocorrelation and innovation variance for monthly nominal output growth in such a way that the
resulting process|when time-aggregated to a quarterly frequency|has the same autocorrelation and unconditional
variance as quarterly nominal GDP growth in the data.
21and  = 0:0425. We vary h and l so that the model matches the median frequency of price
changes and a particular fraction of price changes in the low menu cost state. The gure shows
that the degree of monetary non-neutrality drops o rapidly as the fraction of price changes in the
low cost state falls below 100%. When 85% of price changes occur in the low menu cost state, the
variance of output is less than half of what it is when all of price changes occur in the low cost
state. When 50% of price changes occur in the low menu cost state, the variance of output is close
to identical to the value in the constant menu cost model. Figure 7 therefore suggests that the
relatively large amount of monetary non-neutrality generated by the Calvo model is quite sensitive
to even a modest amount of selection by rms regarding the timing of price changes.
The degree of amplication due to heterogeneity is very similar in the CalvoPlus model to what
it is in the pure menu cost model. To illustrate this, we consider results for the CalvoPlus model
calibrated so that roughly 75% of price changes occur in the low menu cost state in the third
column of table 6. The overall level of monetary non-neutrality is about three time higher in this
calibration of the CalvoPlus model.26 However, the degree of amplication due to heterogeneity is
very similar to what it is in the pure menu cost model. In both cases, allowing for heterogeneity
in the frequency of price change roughly triples the degree of monetary non-neutrality. The same
qualitative results hold for other calibrations of the CalvoPlus model.
5 Intermediate Inputs and Monetary Non-Neutrality
5.1 Intermediate Inputs as a Source of Amplication
We now incorporate intermediate inputs into the model. In section 3, we argue that an empirically
plausible level for the intermediate input share is 0.7. The second column of table 6 presents results
for the menu cost model with this intermediate inputs share. This calibration yields roughly triple
the amount of monetary non-neutrality that the model without intermediate inputs does. Table 8
presents results for several additional values of the intermediate inputs share.
As is well known, the presence of intermediate inputs amplies the degree of monetary non-
neutrality because it causes the pricing decisions of rms in the model to become strategic com-
26For this exercise, we set 1  equal to the frequency of price change in each sector. We set l = h=40 and subject
to this choose h and  to match either the frequency and size of price changes across sectors. This parameterization
implies that roughly 75% of price changes occur in the low menu cost state.
22plements.27 In the model with intermediate inputs, rm's marginal costs are a weighted average of


















given our calibration of   = 0 and  = 1. Since the prices of the rm's inputs are the prices
of the other goods in the economy, the rm's marginal costs depends directly on the prices of
the other goods in the economy. This is the source of strategic complementarity in the model
with intermediate inputs. Since the prices of other goods in the economy respond sluggishly to an
increase in St when rms face menu costs, the rm's marginal costs rise by less than one-percent in
response to a one-percent increase in St when sm > 0. As a consequence, rms that change their
price soon after a shock to St choose a lower price than they would if labor was their only input.
In other words, rms choose not to change their prices as much as they otherwise would because
the price of many of their inputs have not yet responded to the shock.28
An important qualitative dierence between our menu cost model and time-dependent models
is the way in which heterogeneity in the frequency of price chance and intermediate inputs interact.
In our menu cost model, the amplication of monetary non-neutrality due to intermediate inputs
is virtually identical in the multi-sector model as in the single-sector model. In other words, these
two sources of amplication are roughly independent of each other. In contrast, Carvalho (2006)
emphasizes the importance of the interaction between these two features in models with time-
dependent price changes. Our CalvoPlus model conrms this interaction. In the Calvo model with
strategic complementarity and heterogeneity in the frequency of price change, the rms in high
frequency of price change sectors are inuenced by the non-response of rms in the low frequency
of price change sectors. However, rms in the low frequency of price change sectors are much less
inuenced by rms in the high frequency of price change sectors because so many of them don't
27This point was rst made by Basu (1995). Important additional contributions have been made by Huang and Liu
(2004) and Huang (2006). Huang and Liu (2004) show that intermediate inputs increase the persistence of output in
response to monetary shocks in the presence of staggered prices but not in the presence of staggered wages. Huang
(2006) studies a model with both intermediate inputs and specic factors and argues that the presence of these two
factors together generates a negative interaction eect that weakens the degree of strategic complementarity.
28The rm's prot function in our model simply implies that a fraction 1   sm of costs are proportional to St
while a fraction sm are proportional to Pt. In the derivation of this equation, we assume that the \exible" input is
labor and the \sluggish" input is intermediate inputs. However, this prot function is consistent with other models
in which, e.g., wages are sluggish (Burstein and Hellwig, 2006) and other inputs are exible.
23respond at all. In the language of Haltiwanger and Waldman (1991), the high frequency of price
change rms are \responders", while most of the low frequency of price change rms are exogenously
determined to be "non-responders". This asymmetry implies that the equilibrium increasingly
becomes disproportionately aected by the low frequency of price change sectors as the degree
of strategic complementarity increases. In the Calvo model, there is thus an interaction between
strategic complementarity and heterogeneity in the frequency of price change as in Haltiwanger
and Waldman (1991).
In contrast, in the menu cost model, the extensive margin of price change allows the low
frequency of price change rms to be inuenced by the presence of the high frequency of price
change rms to a much greater extent than in the Calvo model. In particular, when a shock occurs,
some rms that would otherwise not have changed their prices do change their prices because rms
in the high frequency of price change sector are changing their prices. This implies that there is not
as sharp a distinction between responders and non-responders and mutes the interaction between
strategic complementarity and heterogeneity in the frequency of price change.
How does the degree of real rigidity in our model compare to the degree of real rigidities in recent
quantitative monetary business cycle models such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007)? The relative volatility of marginal costs and output is a measure
of (
-type) real rigidity both in our model and in these other models. We can directly compare
the degree of real rigidity in our model to these other models by calculating the relative standard
deviation of marginal costs and output in our model and comparing it to this same statistic in a
quantitative DSGE model. Justiniano and Primiceri (2008b) analyze a state-of-the-art quantitative
DSGE model that builds heavily on the models of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and
Smets and Wouters (2007). In their model, the relative standard deviation of marginal costs to
output is 0.36.29 In our model, this statistics is equal to sm. In our baseline calibration with
intermediate inputs, it is thus 0.3. This shows that our calibration implies a very similar degree
of real rigidity as the degree of real rigidity estimated by Justiniano and Primiceri (2008b). Were
we to calibrate sm = 0:64, our model would have the exact same amount of real rigidity as theirs.
This change of calibration would not materially aect our results.
The model we consider above makes the simplifying assumption that sm is the same for all
29We thank Alejandro Justiniano and Giorgio Primiceri for producing this statistic for us. This statistic is for the
time-invariant version of their model.
24sectors and also that all sectors use the same mix of intermediate inputs. We have analyzed an
extension where we allow sm to dier across sectors. We set the sectoral sm based on data from
the U.S. Input-Output data for 2002 presented in table 4. Qualitatively, allowing for this type of
heterogeneity eects our results through two channels. First, the degree of monetary non-neutrality
in a sector is a convex function of sm, other things equal. Jensens' inequality thus implies that an
economy with heterogeneous sm will have more monetary non-neutrality than an economy in which
all sectors have the average sm. Second, the degree of amplication due to heterogeneity is aected
by the correlation between sm and the frequency of price change across sectors. Empirically, sm
in a sector is positively correlated with the frequency of price change in the sector. This leads to
further amplication of monetary non-neutrality since the price level in relatively exible sectors
is held back by heavy use of intermediate inputs from sticky sectors. Quantitatively, extending our
model to allow for heterogeneity in sm across sectors raises the degree of monetary non-neutrality,
but the magnitude of the eect is quite small.
It is much harder computationally to allow dierent sectors to use dierent mixes of intermediate
inputs in our menu cost model since this would require the ination rates of all 14 sectors to be
state variables in the model. However, Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2009a) have been able
to carefully analyze these issues in the context of the multi-sector Calvo model. Thy incorporate
detailed evidence on sectoral input-output tables into a multi-sector Calvo model. They nd that
the amplication of monetary non-neutrality associated with sectoral heterogeneity carries over to
this more general environment.
5.2 A Comparison with Other Sources of Strategic Complementarity
Strategic complementarity has long been an important source of amplication of nominal rigidi-
ties (Ball and Romer, 1990; Woodford, 2003). However, recent work has cast doubt on strategic
complementarity as a source of amplication in menu cost models with idiosyncratic shocks by
showing that the introduction of strategic complementarity can make it dicult to match the
large observed size of price changes for plausible values of the menu cost and the variance of the
idiosyncratic shocks. Klenow and Willis (2006) show that a model with demand-side strategic
complementarity of the type emphasized by Kimball (1995) requires massive idiosyncratic shocks
and implausibly large menu costs to match the size of price changes observed in the data. Golosov
25and Lucas (2007) note that their model generates price changes that are much smaller than those
observed in the data when they consider a production function with diminishing returns to scale
due to a xed factor of production. Burstein and Hellwig (2006) use supermarket scanner data to
calibrate a model with a xed factor of production and both demand and supply shocks. They nd
that even with large demand shocks, a substantial amount of strategic complementarity requires
large menu costs to match the micro data on the size of price changes.
The challenge rst emphasized by Klenow and Willis (2006) that commonly used sources of
monetary non-neutrality cannot match the size of price changes for reasonable parameter values
is a serious one given the extent to which many monetary business cycle models rely on these
mechanisms to amplify monetary non-neutrality. However, it is not clear from Klenow and Willis
(2006), what the scope of this problem is. Does it apply to all sources of strategic complementarity
of just some? If if only applies to some, to which ones does it apply? The goal of this subsection if
to clarify this issue.
Strategic complementarity generated by rms' use of intermediate inputs does not aect the
size of price changes or require unrealistically large menu costs and idiosyncratic shocks (see table
3). The reason for this dierence can be illustrated using a dichotomy developed by Ball and Romer
(1990) and Kimball (1995). A rm's period t prot function may be written as (pt=Pt;St=Pt; ~ At),
where pt=Pt is the rm's relative price, St=Pt denotes real aggregate demand and ~ At denotes a
vector of all other variables that enter the rms period t prot function. The rm's desired price
under exible prices is then given by 1(pt=Pt;St=Pt; ~ At) = 0, where the subscript on the function







Pricing decisions are strategic complements if  =  12=11 < 1 and strategic substitutes oth-
erwise.30 Following Ball and Romer (1990), we can divide mechanisms for generating strategic
complementarity into two classes: 1) those that raise  11, and 2) those that lower 12. We refer
to these two classes as !-type strategic complementarity and 
-type strategic complementarity,
respectively.31 Mechanisms that generate !-type strategic complementarity include non-isoelastic
demand and xed factors of production. Mechanisms that generate 
-type strategic complemen-
30At the equilibrium 11 < 0 and 12 > 0.
31These names are based on the notation used by Kimball (1995).
26tarity include real wage rigidity and sticky intermediate inputs. Notice that @pt=@ ~ At =  13=11.
This implies that !-type strategic complementarity mutes the response of the rm's desired price
to other variables such as idiosyncratic shocks, while 
-type strategic complementarity does not.
Models with a large amount of !-type strategic complementarity therefore have trouble matching
the large size of price changes seen in the micro-data, while this problem does not arise in models
with a large amount of 
-type strategic complementarity.
The key dierence between the two types of strategic complementarity is that strategic com-
plementarity due to intermediate inputs only aects the rm's response to aggregate shocks while
strategic complementarity due to a xed factor or non-isoelastic demand mutes the rm's response
to both aggregate shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. In the model with a xed factor, the rm's
marginal product of labor increases as its level of production falls. The rm's marginal costs there-
fore fall as it raises its price in response to a fall in productivity, since a higher price leads to lower
demand. This endogenous feedback of the rm's price on its marginal costs counteracts the original
eect that the fall in productivity had on marginal costs and leads the rms desired price to rise
by less than it otherwise would. In the model with intermediate inputs, the rm's marginal cost is
not aected by its own pricing decision. The strategic complementarity in the model with interme-
diate inputs arises because of the rigidity of other rms' prices rather than because of endogenous
feedback on marginal costs from the rm's own pricing decision.
Gertler and Leahy (2008) explore an alternative menu cost model with strategic complemen-
tarity that does not aect the size of price changes. Their model has sector specic labor markets
in which rms receive periodic idiosyncratic shocks. They assume that in each period rms in
only a fraction of sectors receive idiosyncratic shocks and change their prices. This staggering of
price changes across sectors generates strategic complementarity that amplies the monetary non-
neutrality in their model. The fact that the labor market is segmented at the sectoral level rather
than the rm level avoids endogenous feedback on marginal costs from the rms' own pricing de-
cisions and allows their model to match the size of price changes without resorting to large shocks
or large menu costs.
The Gertler-Leahy model assumes that in each period their are entire sectors in which no rm
changes prices and other sectors where a large fraction of rms change prices. Time series data
on the evolution of the frequency of price change in dierent sectors of the U.S. economy does not
27support the notion that the frequency of price change within narrowly dened categories varies
greatly from month to month, even within city. In principle, a similar eect arises if one assumes
only that the frequency of price change varies across sectors. We have simulated a 6-sector menu
cost model with sector specic labor markets in which the frequency and size of price change is
calibrated to match the mean of these statistics in dierent sectors of the U.S. economy. This model
does not generate a quantitatively signicant degree of strategic complementarity.
5.3 Intermediate Inputs and Sectoral Comovement
Another important dierence between the model with intermediate inputs and the model without
intermediate inputs is the dierence in the behavior of sectoral output. The relatively modest
response of aggregate value-added output to aggregate demand shocks in the model without in-
termediate inputs masks much larger responses of output in individual sectors. Figure 8 plots
the response of aggregate output and sectoral output to an expansionary demand shock in our
14 sector model without intermediate inputs. The sectoral responses vary greatly. Output in the
sectors with most price rigidity rises by several times as much as aggregate output, while output
in the sectors with most price exibility falls sharply. Figure 9 is the corresponding plot for the
model with intermediate inputs. In contrast to the model without intermediate inputs, output in
all sectors rises sharply in response to an expansionary demand shock and the dierences between
sectors are relatively modest.
In the model without intermediate inputs, the desired price of all rms rises approximately one-
for-one in percentage terms with nominal aggregate demand and is approximately independent of
the prices charged by other rms. As a consequence, the sectoral price index in sectors with a high
frequency of price change|such as gasoline|quickly rises proportionally to the shock, while the
sectoral price index in sectors with more rigid prices adjusts more slowly. This causes a large change
in relative prices across sectors which leads consumers to shift expenditures toward the sectors in
which prices are lower (the sticky price sectors). In contrast, in the model with intermediate goods,
a rm's desired price is heavily dependent on the prices of other rms. This implies that even the
exible price rms don't react strongly to the shock and relative price dierences are much smaller.
A key characteristic of business cycles is that virtually all sectors of the economy comove strongly
(Lucas, 1977; Stock and Watson, 1999). The lack of comovement across sectors in the model without
28intermediate inputs is therefore grossly at odds with the data.32 This lack of comovement across
sectors in models with heterogeneity in the degree of price exibility has been noted and analyzed
by several recent papers including Bils et al. (2003), Barsky et al. (2007) and Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2006). The analysis above shows that allowing for intermediate goods substantially increases the
comovement between dierent sectors of the economy.33 This result also holds in our extended
model with heterogeneity in intermediate input use. Barsky et al. (2007) discuss a number of other
mechanisms for ameliorating this \comovement problem".34
6 Extending the Model to Incorporate Product Turnover
The baseline model we have adopted in this paper is one in which price rigidity arises because rms
face a xed cost of changing their prices. In this setting, rms optimally choose the timing of price
changes as well as the new price they set. We have identied regular price changes in the data as
price changes that are timed optimally by rms. However, in addition to always having the option
of incurring a xed cost to change their price, rms may also receive occasional opportunities to
change their prices at comparatively low cost. The CalvoPlus model we introduce in section 2.3
captures this possibility. These additional low cost price changes will aect the degree of price
exibility in the economy. However, since their timing is not chosen optimally, they will induce less
price exibility than the same number of regular price changes.
An important example of instances in which rms may receive opportunities to change their
prices at low cost is the times at which rms introduce new products. Product turnover is quite
rapid in certain sectors of the economy. And when a rm introduces a new product, it must
necessarily set a new price for this product. Rapid product turnover can therefore aect the degree
32It is easy to show that aggregate productivity shocks lead to similar lack of comovement across sectors.
33Hornstein and Praschnik (1997), Dupor (1999) and Horvath (2000) discuss the eects of input-output linkages
for comovement in a real business cycle framework.
34Bils et al. (2003) argue that the relative price of goods in sectors with exible prices do not increase after an
expansionary monetary policy shock as sticky-price business cycle model imply they should. Boivin et al. (2009)
point out that the empirical model used by Bils et al. (2003) gives rise to a substantial \price-puzzle" in response to
monetary shocks with ination falling for several quarters after an expansionary shock. Boivin et al. (2009) argue
that this suggests misspecication of the monetary shocks. They analyze the behavior of sectoral output after a
monetary shock in a factor augmented VAR that does not give rise to a price puzzle and show that their estimates
regarding relative prices of exible priced goods line up will with sticky-price model. Using a dierent empirical
strategy, Mackowiak et al. (2009) nd that prices in sectors with exible prices respond more rapidly to aggregate
shocks than price in sectors with sticky prices. Bouakez et al. (2009) provide further evidence that sectors with more
frequent price changes respond more rapidly to monetary policy shocks using a structural estimation approach.
29of price exibility in the economy. Furthermore, since rms can often anticipate future product
turnover|e.g., fall-spring turnover in apparel|they may decide not to incur the xed cost needed
to change the price of an existing product.
Table 2 reports the frequency of product substitution for the sectors in our multi-sector models.35
It reveals that product substitution is a frequent occurrence in several categories of durable goods|
Apparel, Transportation Goods (Cars), Household Furnishing and Recreation Goods|but less
frequent for other products. A number of these categories|especially Apparel|have a very low
frequency of price change but a substantial frequency of product turnover.
Many factors inuence a rm's decision about the timing of new product introduction including
seasonality, development cycles, innovation and random shifts in consumer tastes. Figure 10 plots
the frequency of product substitution across dierent months of the year for the four categories for
which product substitution is most frequent. In Apparel, seasonal variation in tastes is a dominant
factor in the timing of product introduction. The main determinant of the timing of product entry
and exit is the timing of the fall and spring clothing seasons. In the automobile industry, product
introduction is heavily inuenced by a yearly development cycle with new models being introduced
in the fall of each year.
This evidence suggests that in these product categories|where product turnover is relatively
important|the timing of product turnover may be largely orthogonal to a rm's desire to change
its price and to macroeconomic conditions. A computationally tractable way of modeling this type
of event is to consider a model in which new products arrive according to an exogenous Poisson
process. This model is equivalent to the CalvoPlus model where l = 0 and 1    in each sector
is equal to the frequency of product substitution.36 In this calibration of the CalvoPlus model,
the menu cost in the high cost state is set so that the frequency of high cost price changes in the
model matches the frequency of price change for identical items in the data for each sector. In
35Ideally we would have a measure of the rate of product introduction since pricing decisions are made when new
products are introduced. However, the BLS does not track the introduction of new products. When a product that
the BLS has been tracking becomes permanently unavailable, the BLS agent is instructed to substitute to the most
similar existing product. In most cases this product will have existed for some time. If the hazard of product exit
is upward sloping, the frequency of product substitution is therefore an upward biased measure of the frequency of
product introduction.
36One could also consider a \TaylorPlus" model, i.e., a model in which product introduction was on a xed schedule
as in Taylor (1980). Such a TaylorPlus model is much less tractable computationally since the months of the year are
state variables in that model. However, the crucial element is not whether or not agents anticipate the specic date
on which they will introduce new products but rather whether or not product introductions arise from rms' desire
to change their prices as opposed to other factors such as seasonality, the new model year or product innovation.
30other words, all price changes for identical items are viewed as state dependent as in our baseline
menu cost model. However, now we consider an additional dimension of exibility in the form of
price changes due to product turnover.37
Table 9 shows that product turnover associated with factors unrelated to the rms' pricing
decisions have little eect on the monetary non-neutrality implied by the model. This is because
the \selection eect" applies only to the regular price changes. While new fashion items are priced
to keep up with ination, they are not (in this model) introduced because the old fashion items
were mispriced. For comparison purposes, table 9 also presents results for a calibration of the menu
cost model where we treat product introductions as if they were the same as regular price changes.
In this case, \product exibility" would have a much larger eect on monetary non-neutrality. In
either case, the inclusion of product substitutions in the model has little eect on the amplication
eect associated with heterogeneity.
7 Do Menu Costs Generate Sizable Monetary Non-Neutrality?
In the context of a simple menu cost model, Golosov and Lucas (2007) argue that the amount of
monetary non-neutrality generated by nominal rigidities is \small and transient". An important
question is whether this conclusion holds up in a richer, more realistic setting. To answer this ques-
tion, we compare the variance of real output generated by our multi-sector model with intermediate
inputs in response to calibrated aggregate nominal shocks to the variance of HP-ltered log U.S.
real GDP.
Table 10 reports the results of this comparison. The variance of HP-ltered log U.S. real GDP
for the period 1947-2006 is 2:7210 4. The menu cost model is simulated with nominal aggregate
shocks that are calibrated as described in section 3 to match the behavior of log U.S. nominal GDP
over the period 1947-2005, less the growth rate of log real GDP. The variance of real output in
response to these nominal aggregate shocks in our multi-sector model with intermediate inputs is
0:6310 4. Our model is therefore able to account for 23% of the U.S. business cycle. This result
37Broda and Weinstein (2007) argue that product introduction is pro-cyclical. However, the variation in product
turnover at business cycle frequencies is an order of magnitude smaller than the seasonality we document in gure
10. They study product turnover for non-durable goods for which the average rate of product turnover is quite low.
The assumptions we make here abstract from this for simplicity. One could easily extend our model to consider
intermediate cases where the timing of some product introductions but not others are exogenous to the rm's desire
to change prices.
31of our model accords well with empirical evidence on the importance of nominal shocks for business
cycle uctuations. Lucas (2003) argues that the shocks that Shapiro and Watson (1988) refer to as
\demand" shocks should be interpreted as \nominal" shocks. These shocks capture not only the
eect of monetary disturbances but also temporary monetary non-neutrality due to real shocks.
Shapiro and Watson (1988) attribute 28% of the variation in output at short horizons to these
nominal shocks. In contrast, a single-sector version of our model without intermediate inputs|a
model that is virtually identical to the Golosov and Lucas (2007) model|yields variation in real
output that can account for only 2% of the U.S. business cycle.38
Our model does not incorporate aggregate real shocks. It is therefore not able to match the
behavior of real output. The absence of aggregate real shocks in our model also means that we
must abstract from any relationship between real shocks and movements in nominal aggregate
demand. In a richer model with both real and nominal aggregate shocks, it would be possible to
allow nominal aggregate demand to respond both to real shocks and nominal shocks. It would
then be possible to \turn o" the nominal shocks and assess how large a fraction of business cycle
uctuations in output they cause. This type of exercise would arguably yield a preferable estimate
of importance of monetary non-neutrality in business cycle dynamics to the one we present above.
Carrying out this exercise is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
8 Conclusion
Recent work on state-dependent pricing models suggests that these models generate only a \small
and transient" amount of monetary non-neutrality (Golosov and Lucas, 2007). Given the impor-
tance of nominal rigidities as a source of monetary non-neutrality in most models that analyze the
transmission of monetary policy, this conclusion poses a serious challenge for monetary economics.
We extend a simple benchmark menu cost model to include two features for which there exists par-
ticularly clear empirical evidence: 1) Heterogeneity across sectors in the frequency and size of price
changes; 2) Intermediate inputs. We show that when we subject our model to calibrated nominal
shocks it generates uctuations in real output that can account for 23% of the U.S. business cycle.
This accords well with Shapiro and Watson's (1988) result that 28% of variation in output at short
38Midrigan (2006) identies two other mechanisms that raise the degree of monetary non-neutrality in a menu cost
model: fat-tailed idiosyncratic shocks and multi-product rms with scale economies in changing prices.
32horizons is due to nominal shocks.
Our multi-sector model generates three times as much monetary non-neutrality as does a single-
sector model calibrated to the mean frequency and size of price changes. This amplication due to
heterogeneity is driven by three features of the U.S. data: 1) the low average level of ination in the
U.S. economy, 2) the fact that the average size of price changes is large and that there is no strong
correlation between the size and frequency of price change across sectors, and 3) the relatively low
average frequency of price change in the U.S. economy. A single-sector menu cost model calibrated
to match the median frequency of price change yields a degree of monetary non-neutrality that is
similar to the multi-sector model.
The introduction of intermediate inputs raises the degree of monetary non-neutrality by another
factor of three. Intermediate inputs amplify the degree of monetary non-neutrality because they
generate a substantial amount of strategic complementarity in the pricing decisions of dierent
rms. Importantly, the model can t both the size and frequency of price change. In contrast,
other popular sources of strategic complementarity|such as xed factors of production and non-
isoelastic demand curves|yield price changes that are much too small on average for reasonable
parameter values. Following Ball and Romer (1990) and Kimball (1995), we divide the sources of
strategic complementarity into two classes|!-type strategic complementarity and 
-type strategic
complementarity. We show that models with a large amount of !-type strategic complementarity
are unable to match the average size of price changes, while this problem does not aict models
with a large amount of 
-type strategic complementarity. An empirically realistic intermediate
input share can generate a substantial amount of 
-type strategic complementarity. Sector specic
labor markets, however, do not generate a substantial amount of such strategic complementarity
unless price adjustments are heavily staggered across sectors; something we do not observe in the
data.
33A Prot Function
Cost minimization by rm z implies that labor demand and demand for the composite intermediate
input be governed by
Wt
Pt






















































































It(z)   U: (19)
Using the rm's demand curve|equation (12)|and the labor supply curve|equation (7)|we can
rewrite prots as
R
























t It(z)   U:
Finally, log-linear approximations of Yt = Ct+
R 1
0 Mt(z)dz, the production function and labor supply
around the steady state with exible prices yield ^ Yt = a1 ^ Ct and ^ Lt = a2 ^ Ct. Here ^ Yt = log(Yt=Y )
and Y denotes the steady state of Yt with exible prices. ^ Ct and ^ Lt are dened analogously. Using
these log-linear approximations and the fact that Ct = St=Pt, we can rewrite prots as a function
of (At(z);pt 1(z)=Pt;St=Pt) and pt(z).
34B Stationary Distribution
We solve for the stationary distribution over the state space of the rm's problem using the following
algorithm:
0. Start with an initial distribution Q(A(z);p 1(z)=P;S=P). We use a uniform distribution as
our initial distribution.
1. Map Q(A(z);p 1(z)=P;S=P) into Q(A(z);p(z)=P;S=P) using the policy function F.
2. Map Q(A(z);p(z)=P;S=P) into Q(A+1(z);p(z)=P;S=P) using the transition probability ma-
trix for the technology process.
3. Map Q(A+1(z);p(z)=P;S=P) into Q(A+1(z);p(z)=P;S+1=P) using the probability transition
matrix for the nominal aggregate demand process.
4. Map Q(A+1(z);p(z)=P;S+1=P) into Q(A+1(z);p(z)=P+1;S+1=P+1) using the function  .
5. Check whether jQ(A+1(z);p(z)=P+1;S+1=P+1)   Q(A(z);p 1(z)=P;S=P)j <  where j  j de-
notes a sup-norm. If so, stop. If not, go back to step one.
35C A Model with Capital
Consider an extension of the model presented in section 2 in which rms use capital as well as labor
and intermediate inputs to produce goods. The presence of capital aects the equilibrium behavior
of this type of model primarily by aecting the cyclicality of marginal costs. If the marginal product
of capital is highly variable over the cycle, this will raise the cyclicality of rms' marginal costs and
thereby reduce the amount of monetary non-neutrality generated by the model. In the language of
section 5, capital may generate 
-type strategic substitutability.
Capital adjustment costs make the capital stock adjust sluggishly to variations in the marginal
product of capital. Such adjustment costs thus increase the variability of the marginal product of
capital and the variability of rms' marginal costs (Christiano et al. 2005). The capital stock being
xed is a limiting case as capital adjustment costs become large. Other things equal, the eect
that introducing capital into our model has to reduce monetary non-neutrality is thus maximized
if the aggregate capital stock in the economy is xed. To simplify our analysis, we assume that the
aggregate capital stock is xed and analyze the eect that introducing capital has on the cyclicality
of marginal costs. We interpret our results as an upper bound on the eect that capital would have
on the cyclicality of marginal costs. A model with smaller adjustment costs would inply a smaller
response of marginal cost to output and thus greater monetary non-neutrality.
C.1 Household Behavior
Households own the capital stock and rent it to rms each period in a competitive capital mar-
ket. Since capital is xed, households make no choices regarding capital. The household budget
constraint becomes




where Rt denotes the real rental rate on capital and K denotes the xed amount of capital owned
by the households. Households behave as before.
C.2 Firm Behavior
The production function of rm z is given by
yt(z) = At(z)(Lt(z)Kt(z)1 )1 smMt(z)sm: (21)
36Cost minimization by rms implies
Wt
Pt




Rt = (1   sm)(1   )Lt(z)(1 sm)Kt(z)(1 )(1 sm) 1Mt(z)sm
t(z);
where 
t(z) denotes the marginal costs of rm z at time t. Eliminating 


















These two equations imply that all rms have the same capital-labor ratio and the same materials-
labor ratio.




































































































Equation (24) is close to being identical to equation (19). There are two dierences. First, the
constant 	 is dierent from the corresponding constant in equation (19). Second, the second term
in equation (24) has an additional piece involving the ratio of the rental rate and the real wage.
Notice that the average real marginal cost is pinned down by the assumed markup.
37The dierence in the elasticity of marginal cost between the model with capital and the model






If Rt is more cyclical than Wt=Pt, the model with capital will have more cyclical marginal costs
than the model without capital.








If we log-linearize this equation, aggregate the resulting equation and use the fact that aggregate
capital is xed, we get ^ Ct + ^ Lt = ^ Rt.




(1   sm) + sm=
^ Ct  a2 ^ Ct;
Combining this equation with ^ Ct + ^ Lt = ^ Rt yields ^ Rt = (1 + a2) ^ Ct. Since, the real wage in our
model has a unit elasticity with respect to output, this shows that the rental rate is more cyclical
than the real wage.
The equations above imply that the overall elasticity of marginal cost with respect to output
in the model with capital is (1 sm)(1+a2(1 )). If we assume that the capital share is 1/3 and
the intermediate input share is 0.7, then the elasticity of marginal cost is 0.38. Adding capital to
the model thus increases the cyclicality of marginal costs from 0.3 to 0.38. The empirical results of
Solon, Barsky, and Parker (1994) on the cyclicality of real wages suggest that for the U.S. economy
the elasticity of real wages with respect to output is in fact only about 0.6. Our calibration without
capital thus somewhat overstates the elasticity of real wages with respect to output. If we redo the
elasticity calculation for the model with capital using the real wage elasticity from Solon, Barsky,
and Parker (1994), we get an elasticity of marginal cost of 0.28. This is almost exactly equal to
the elasticity of 0.3 that we assume in our baseline model. In other words, we have adopted a
baseline specication that implies an elasticity of marginal costs similar to what is implied by a
model with capital and calibrated to match the empirical evidence presented in Solon, Barsky, and
Parker (1994). The addition of these two features|capital and a realistic value for the elasticity
38of real wages with respect to output|thus roughly cancel each other out and yield a model with
the same amount our real rigidities as our benchmark model.
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44Discount factor β = 0.96
1/12
Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ = 1
Inverse of Frisch elasticity of labor supply ψ = 0
Elasticity of demand θ = 4
Steady state labor supply L = 1/3
Intermediate inputs share in production sm = 0.7
Speed of mean reversion of idiosyncratic productivity ρ = 0.7
Mean growth rate of nominal aggregate demand μ = 0.0028
St. deviation of the growth rate of nominal aggregate demand ση = 0.0065
Table 1: Benchmark ParametersName Weight Freq. Abs. Size Subs
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Panel A: 6 Sector Model
Vehicle Fuel, Used Cars 7.7 91.6 4.9 8.9
Transportation Goods, Utilities, Travel 19.1 35.5 10.9 4.5
Unprocessed Food 5.9 25.4 15.9 1.3
Processed Food, Other Goods 13.7 11.9 11.4 2.0
Services (excl. Travel) 38.5 8.8 8.3 2.0
Household Furnishings, Apparel, Recreation Goods 15.1 5.2 11.1 7.9
Panel B: 9 Sector Model
Vehicle Fuel, Used Cars 7.7 91.6 4.9 8.9
Transportation Goods, Utilities, Travel 19.1 35.5 10.9 4.5
Unprocessed Food 5.9 25.4 15.9 1.3
Services(1) 9.2 19.7 4.6 2.1
Processed Food, Other Goods 13.7 11.9 11.4 2.0
Services(2) 9.6 7.6 7.2 3.7
Services(3) 10.0 5.5 8.1 1.3
Household Furnishings, Apparel, Recreation Goods 15.1 5.2 11.1 7.9
Services(4) 9.7 3.2 12.8 0.9
Panel C: 14 Sector Model
Vehicle Fuel, Used Cars 7.7 91.6 4.9 8.9
Utilities 5.3 49.4 6.4 0.6
Travel 5.5 43.7 18.4 1.8
Unprocessed Food 5.9 25.4 15.9 1.3
Transportation Goods 8.3 21.3 8.9 8.8
Services (1) 7.7 21.7 4.0 2.2
Processed Food, Other Goods 13.7 11.9 11.4 2.0
Services (2) 7.5 8.4 6.7 4.4
Household Furnishing  5.0 6.5 10.1 5.0
Services (3) 7.8 6.2 8.8 1.7
Recreation Goods 3.6 6.1 10.2 5.9
Services (4) 7.6 4.9 8.1 0.9
Apparel 6.5 3.6 12.4 11.3
Services (5) 7.9 2.9 13.5 1.0
Table 2: Sector Characteristics for Multi-Sector Models
This table presents the weighted mean frequency and log absolute size of price changes as well as the frequency of
product substitution for US consumer prices over the period 1998-2005 for divisions into 6, 9, and 14 sectors.
These statistics are calculated using the methodology described in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008), based on the
individual price quotes underlying the US consumer price index (CPI). The weighted means are calculated using
CPI expenditure weights for entry level items (ELI's). "Weight" gives the total expenditure weight for the
category, "Freq." gives the weighted mean frequency of price change for the category, "Abs. Size" gives the
weighted mean absolute size of log price changes for the category. "Subs" gives the weighted mean frequency of
product substitution. See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for more details on how these statistics are constructed.
In the 9 and 14 sector models, the Service sector is divided equally into 4 and 5 groups respectively, where the










Panel A: 6 Sector Model
Vehicle Fuel, Used Cars 0.004 5.00 0.001 5.10 0.007 5.99 0.001 5.00
Transp. Goods, Utilities, Travel 0.309 6.90 0.087 6.85 0.399 8.63 0.110 8.50
Unprocessed Food 0.667 9.10 0.194 9.20 0.967 12.40 0.268 12.30
Processed Food, Other Goods 0.331 5.70 0.091 5.70 0.516 9.20 0.129 8.69
Services (excl. Travel) 0.165 3.90 0.046 4.05 0.269 6.75 0.075 6.90
Hh. Furn., Apparel, Rec. Goods 0.271 5.46 0.070 5.40 0.446 9.85 0.107 9.00
Panel B: 9 Sector Model
Vehicle Fuel, Used Cars 0.004 5.30 0.002 5.40 0.007 5.20 0.001 4.98
Transp. Goods, Utilities, Travel 0.307 6.90 0.091 7.00 0.399 8.63 0.115 8.70
Unprocessed Food 0.667 9.00 0.185 9.00 0.963 12.30 0.234 11.60
Services(1) 0.059 2.40 0.019 2.65 0.099 3.76 0.022 3.40
Processed Food, Other Goods 0.340 5.80 0.093 5.70 0.545 9.41 0.132 8.80
Services(2) 0.137 3.50 0.035 3.45 0.220 6.10 0.065 6.50
Services(3) 0.156 3.80 0.042 3.90 0.261 6.75 0.070 7.20
Hh. Furn., Apparel, Rec. Goods 0.306 5.80 0.076 5.40 0.451 9.77 0.121 9.50
Services(4) 0.340 6.50 0.083 6.39 0.474 11.31 0.122 11.60
Panel C: 14 Sector Model
Vehicle Fuel, Used Cars 0.005 5.20 0.002 5.20 0.007 5.39 0.002 5.30
Utilities 0.095 4.65 0.027 4.80 0.112 5.28 0.032 5.30
Travel 0.636 11.10 0.210 12.00 0.931 14.00 0.265 14.00
Unprocessed Food 0.724 9.40 0.198 9.00 0.969 12.40 0.266 12.20
Transportation Goods 0.244 5.20 0.060 4.71 2.758 6.80 0.082 6.80
Services (1) 0.069 2.70 0.023 2.97 0.057 3.00 0.019 3.20
Processed Food, Other Goods 0.322 5.60 0.095 5.75 0.508 9.00 1.286 8.90
Services (2) 0.117 3.20 0.034 3.30 0.200 5.70 0.056 5.70
Household Furnishing  0.228 4.80 0.065 4.69 0.405 8.80 0.107 8.70
Services (3) 0.177 4.10 0.049 4.10 0.298 7.40 0.085 7.60
Recreation Goods 0.239 4.80 0.064 4.80 0.413 8.80 0.112 8.90
Services (4) 0.159 3.80 0.047 4.00 0.307 7.60 0.073 7.20
Apparel 0.331 6.05 0.087 5.99 0.537 10.50 0.131 10.50
Services (5) 0.388 7.01 0.102 6.82 0.528 11.50 0.158 12.00
This table presents the cost of changing prices and the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks for the multi-sector menu cost
model and CalvoPlus model both with and without intermediate goods. "Δp cost" denotes the average cost of changing
prices in a year as a fraction of steady state revenue. In the menu cost model this is equal to f(θ-1)/θ χ/YSS where f denotes
the frequency of price change and YSS is steady state output under flexible prices. In the CalvoPlus model it is calculated
analogously but the high menu cost is applied to the price changes that occure in the high menu cost state and the low
menu cost to the price changes that occure in the low menu cost state. σε is the variance of shocks to the log of the
idiosyncratic productivity shocks. sm is the fraction of marginal costs accounted for by intermediate goods. In the
CalvoPlus model, the fraction of time spent in the "low menu cost" state is set at 1-α = freq. for each sector in all cases.
Table 3 : Parameter Values for Multi-Sector Models
Menu Cost Model CalvoPlus Model
sm = 0 sm = 0.7 sm = 0 sm = 0.7% Int. Inputs % Used % Gross Y % GDP % CPI
Agriculture and Mining 55.1 5.5 2.4 1.9 0.0
Utilities 36.8 2.6 1.7 2.0 5.3
Construction 46.8 1.5 4.8 4.6 0.0
Manufacturing 64.9 28.8 20.5 12.9 51.2
Trade 31.7 6.2 10.4 12.8 0.0
Services 39.3 53.0 48.7 53.0 43.5
Government 37.9 0.9 11.5 12.8 0.0
Table 4: Intermediate Inputs in the U.S. Economy in 2002
These data (except the last column) are from the 2002 "Use" table of the U.S. Annual Input-
Output Accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The last column is taken from
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). "% Int. Inputs" denotes the fraction of intermediate inputs in
each sectors gross output. "% Used" denotes the fraction of all intermediate inputs in the economy
that come from each sector. "% Gross Y" denotes each sector's weight in gross output. "% GDP"
denotes each sector's weight in GDP. "% CPI" denotes each sector's weight in the CPI.
Category CPI PPI
Processed Food 32 10.5 7.2
Unprocessed Food 24 25.9 67.9
Household Furnishings 27 6.5 5.6
Apparel 32 3.6 2.7
Recreation Goods 16 6.8 6.1
Other Goods 13 23.2 17.1
Table 5: Frequency of Price Change: Comparison of CPI and PPI
Num. of 
Matches
Frequency of Price Change
This table presents a comparison between the frequency of price change for consumer prices excluding
sales and producer prices over the 1998-2005 period. These statistics are from Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008), and are based on the individual price quotes underlying the US consumer price index (CPI) and
producer price index (PPI). These statistics are constructed by matching Entry Level Items (ELI's) in the
CPI to 4, 6 or 8-digit commodity codes within the PPI. "Num. of Matches" denotes the number of such
matches that were possible within the Major Group. "Frequency of price change" denotes the median
frequency across categories among the matches found. See Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for more
details on how these statistics are constructed.  sm = 0 sm = 0.7 sm = 0 sm = 0.7
1 Sector Model (Mean) 0.055 0.182 0.173 0.461
6 Sector Model 0.136 0.470 0.458 1.492
9 Sector Model 0.143 0.576 0.495 1.563
14 Sector Model 0.188 0.627 0.520 1.709
1 Sector Model (Median) 0.261 0.658 0.625 1.480
Table 6: Heterogeneity and Monetary Non-Neutrality
Menu Cost Model CalvoPlus Model
Monetary Non-Neutrality: Var(C t)
This table presents estimates of the variance or real value-added output for the multi-sector menu cost model and the
multi-sector CalvoPlus model for two values of the intermediate inputs share (sm). The variance of real value added
output is multiplied by 10
4. The first two columns present results for the menu cost model. The third and fourth
columns present results for the CalvoPlus model. See Table 4 for the menu cost and variance of idiosyncratic shocks
assumed in these models. These statistics are presented for versions of the menu cost model with 1, 6, 9 and 14
sectors. In the CalvoPlus model, the fraction of time spent in the "low menu cost" state is set at 1-α = freq. for each
sector in all cases. 
Freq 1 Freq 2 Var(Ct) Freq Var(Ct)
(1) 0.10 0.20 0.1194 0.15 0.1050 1.137
(2) 0.20 0.30 0.0395 0.25 0.0360 1.098
(3) 0.30 0.40 0.0154 0.35 0.0152 1.014
(4) 0.40 0.50 0.0060 0.45 0.0059 1.010
(5) 0.10 0.30 0.0889 0.20 0.0620 1.433
(6) 0.10 0.40 0.0702 0.25 0.0360 1.949
Two Sector Models One Sector Models
Table 7: Amplification due to Heterogeneity
The table presents estimates of monetary non-neutrality for 6 two sector models and 6 one
sector models. Each row in the table presents a two sector model in which the two sectors
have different frequencies of price change and a one sector model with a frequency of
price change equal to the average frequency of price change in the two sector model in
that row. "Freq 1" denotes the frequency of price change in sector 1 of the two sector
model. "Freq 2" denotes the frequency of price change in the other sector. "Freq" denotes
the frequency of price change in the one sector model. "Var(Ct)" denotes the variance of
output multiplied by 10
4. "Amp. Factor" denotes the factor by which monetary non-
neutrality is higher in the two-sector model than in the one sector model.
Amp. 
FactorInterm. Input Share 21.1% 8.7%
(1) 0.00 0.055 0.261
(2) 0.50 0.109 0.443
(3) 0.60 0.133 0.518
(4) 0.70 0.182 0.658
(5) 0.80 0.276 0.844
(6) 0.90 0.471 1.346
This table presents estimates of the variance or real value-added output for a single-
sector version of the menu cost model for several values of the intermediate inputs
share, sm. In all cases, the model is calibrated to match the median size of price
changes of 8.5%. For the first column of results, the model is calibrated to match
the weighted mean frequency of price change of 21.1%, while for the second
column of results it is parameterized to match the weighted median frequency of
price change of 8.7%.
Frequency of Price Change
Table 8: Intermediate Inputs and Monetary Non-Neutrality
Monetary Non-Neutrality: Var(C t)
sm = 0 sm = 0.7 sm = 0 sm = 0.7 sm = 0 sm = 0.7
Monetary Non-Neutrality: Var(C t)
1 Sector Model (Mean) 0.055 0.182 0.173 0.461 0.036 0.157
6 Sector Model 0.136 0.470 0.458 1.492 0.092 0.332
9 Sector Model 0.143 0.576 0.495 1.563 0.104 0.412
14 Sector Model 0.188 0.627 0.520 1.709 0.111 0.410
This table presents estimates of the cumulative impulse response (CIR) and the variance or real value-added output for
three calibrations of our multi-sector models and two values of the intermediate inputs share (sm). The CIR is measured in
percent. The variance of real value added output is multiplied by 10
4. The first two columns present results for the menu
cost model calibrated to match the frequency of price change across sectors. The third and fourth columns present results
for the CalvoPlus model with χl=0 ,1-α = freq. of substitutions and χh calibrated so that that frequency of price change in
the high cost state equals the frequency of price change in the data. The fifth and sixth columns present results for the menu
cost model calibrated to match the frequency of price change plus the frequency of substitutions across sectors.
Table 9: Multi-Sector Models with Product Flexibility
Menu Cost CalvoPlus Subs Menu Cost SubsVar(Ct) Frac. Tot.
(10
-4) (%)
HP-filtered U.S. GDP 1947-2005 2.72 100
Multi-Sector Model with sm=0.7 0.63 23
Multi-Sector Model with sm=0 0.19 7
Single-Sector Model with sm=0.7 0.18 7
Single-Sector Model with sm=0 0.05 2
This table reports the variance of HP-filtered U.S. real GDP for 1947-2005 as well as 
estimates of the variance of real value-added output for a single-sector and the 14-sector 
versions of our menu cost model for two values of the intermediate inputs share (sm).   It also 
reports the fraction of the variance of HP-filtered U.S. real GDP that each of the models can 
account for.
Table 10: Nominal Rigidities and the Business CycleFigure 1: The Distribution of the Frequency of Price Change for U.S. Consumer Prices 
This figure presents a histogram of the cross-sectional distribution of the frequency of non-sale price 
changes in U.S. consumer prices for the period 1998-2005 (percent per month). The figure is based on the 
statistics in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). It is based on the individual price quotes underlying the US 
CPI. The figure shows the expenditure weighted distribution of the frequency of price changes across entry 
level items (ELI's) in the CPI.   
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% weightFigure 2: Actual Inflation and Perceived Inflation for the Multi-Sector Menu Cost Model 
 
This figure compares actual log inflation (crosses) and perceived log inflation (line) for the multi-sector menu 
cost model with intermediate inputs.  More specifically, the line represents the perceived aggregate law of 
motion of log(Pt/Pt-1) as a function of log(St/Pt-1), i.e., the function Γ. The crosses denote actual log inflation as a 





















The figure plots the average frequency and size of price changes for each sector in our 14 sector model. See 
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This figure plots a sample path of the price for a single firm in the model with intermediate inputs. The menu 
cost and variance of idiosyncratic shocks for the firm are set to match the median frequency and size of price 
changes. It also plots the price level and the firm’s static desired price. 
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This figure illustrates how the degree of monetary non-neutrality at a given frequency of price change 
depends on the size of menu costs and the size of idiosyncratic shocks. Each of the solid lines plots the 
degree of monetary non-neutrality in a sector for a given level of idiosyncratic shocks as the size of the 
menu cost changes. From top to bottom, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic shocks (σε) is 0.045, 
0.02, 0.015, 0.01. For all the lines, μ=0.01 and ση. The dashed line connects the four sectors of an 
economy with one sector on each line. 
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This figure plots the variance of value-added output as a function of the frequency of price change for two 
calibrations of our menu cost model without intermediate inputs. First, we present our benchmark calibration of 
μ=0.002, ση=0.0037 and σε=0.0425 (dark line). Second, we present a calibration in which μ=0.01, ση=0.0037 
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This figure presents the variance of value-added output in the single-sector CalvoPlus model without 
intermediate inputs as a function of the fraction of price changes in the low menu cost state.  The variance of the 
idiosyncratic shocks is fixed at σε =0.0425 (the same value as in the single-sector menu cost model without 
intermediate goods).  The menu costs in the high and low menu cost states are calibrated to match the weighted 
median frequency of price change 8.7% and the fraction of price changes in the low menu cost state.  The 






















This figure plots the response of aggregate real value-added output (solid line) and sectoral output for several 
sectors of the 14 sector model without intermediate inputs to a 1% permanent increase in nominal aggregate 
demand. From top to bottom the sectors that are plotted are: Services(5), Apparel, Services(3), Transportation 
Goods, Utilities and Vehicle Fuel and Used Cars. 

































This figure plots the response of aggregate real value-added output (solid line) and sectoral output for several 
sectors of the 14 sector model with intermediate inputs to a 1% permanent increase in nominal aggregate 
demand. From top to bottom the sectors that are plotted are: Services(5), Apparel, Services(3), Transportation 
Goods, Utilities and Vehicle Fuel and Used Cars. 
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